US-Iran Diplomacy Labelled 'Kabuki Theatre' as Trump's Shifting Approach Alarms Gulf Allies

The relationship between Washington and Tehran remains trapped in a volatile cycle of military escalation, diplomatic ambiguity and political calculation, according to Barbara Slavin, a Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center, who appeared on France 24's Spotlight programme to assess the state of the long-running US-Iran confrontation.

Speaking to host François Picard, Slavin described the current situation as one in which genuine diplomacy is conspicuously absent. While there have been indirect contacts between American and Iranian officials, mediated by Qatar, she argued that these exchanges have been far too limited and too fragile to deliver any meaningful breakthrough. She characterised the process as "kabuki diplomacy" — a form of political theatre in which both sides half-engage while carefully positioning themselves to avoid any appearance of compromise.

That assessment points to a deeper problem at the heart of the standoff: neither Washington nor Tehran currently has a domestic political incentive to be seen yielding to pressure from the other. For President Donald Trump, the political cost of appearing weak or of making concessions to Iran would be substantial, particularly among hardline constituencies at home. For the Iranian leadership, meanwhile, sustained pressure on oil markets may actually create incentives to wait rather than to compromise, betting that economic and political patience will serve their interests better than a negotiated settlement reached from a position of perceived vulnerability.

The programme's headline framing reflected another dimension of the story: the reaction of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, who are described as furious at what they see as Trump's inconsistent approach — alternately pursuing deals with Iran and then striking in devastating fashion. That oscillation, captured in the phrase "flips and flops," has left regional partners uncertain about American strategy and concerned about the consequences for their own security.

Slavin's analysis suggests that the coming months are likely to remain a period in which diplomacy stays elusive. The central question, she argues, is whether either side can step back from brinkmanship without sacrificing their respective hardline political positions. That is a difficult balancing act: any move that looks like de-escalation risks being read domestically as capitulation, which in turn makes leaders reluctant to take the first step.

Yet Slavin also emphasised that it is still significant that contacts between the two sides have taken place at all. In a relationship defined for years by hostility, the mere existence of indirect channels — however limited — represents a form of communication that did not previously exist. The challenge now lies in transforming those tentative exchanges into a sustained process capable of actually ending the conflict, rather than merely managing an endless sequence of threats and escalations.

The mediation role played by Qatar adds a further layer of complexity. As a small Gulf state with the ability to talk to both Washington and Tehran, Qatar has positioned itself as an indispensable interlocutor. But the fragility of the channel — indirect, limited and vulnerable to collapse at any moment — underlines how far the parties remain from any structured negotiation. Without a more durable framework, each round of contacts risks being overtaken by events on the ground.

Slavin's comments also highlight the tension between military escalation and diplomatic signalling. When both sides are simultaneously preparing for the possibility of conflict and testing the waters of dialogue, the risk of miscalculation rises sharply. A single incident — a strike, a seizure, a proxy attack — could derail whatever fragile communication exists, pushing the parties back toward confrontation before any process has had time to mature.

The domestic political dimension cuts both ways. In Washington, Trump faces pressure from hawks who favour maximum pressure and from those who argue that endless confrontation serves no American interest. In Tehran, hardliners resist any accommodation that could be portrayed as surrender, while others may see economic relief as essential to stabilising the country. Neither leadership can easily ignore these internal dynamics, which constrain the space for genuine compromise.

The economic dimension, particularly the pressure on oil markets, is also central to Slavin's reading of Iranian incentives. If Tehran believes that sustained market pressure will eventually force Washington's hand, it may calculate that waiting is a more effective strategy than negotiating. That logic makes any near-term diplomatic breakthrough less likely, since it gives Iran a reason to hold firm rather than to make concessions.

For Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, the unpredictability of US policy is a source of acute anxiety. Regional powers that have staked their security on close ties with Washington must now contend with an American approach that can shift between deal-making and devastating attacks. That uncertainty complicates their own calculations, both in relation to Iran and in relation to their broader strategic alignments.

Slavin's background lends weight to her assessment. A distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center and former director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council, she has spent years analysing Tehran's foreign policy and the dynamics of US-Iran relations. Her characterisation of the current moment as one of dangerous ambiguity reflects a wider concern among analysts that the absence of real diplomacy leaves the field open to escalation.

The question of whether brinkmanship can be abandoned without political cost remains unresolved. Both Washington and Tehran have built narratives in which firmness is a virtue and concession is a weakness. Escaping those narratives would require leaders on both sides to redefine what strength looks like — a task that has proven beyond reach in previous rounds of the long confrontation.

Despite the bleak picture, Slavin's emphasis on the significance of contact offers a slender thread of hope. Dialogue, even indirect and mediated, keeps open the possibility of a process that could eventually address the underlying conflict. The task for diplomats and mediators is to build on those exchanges, broadening them into something more durable and capable of withstanding the inevitable shocks that will test the relationship.

Whether that can happen in the months ahead is unclear. What is evident is that the current pattern — a mixture of military escalation, ambiguous signalling and domestic political calculation — carries substantial risks for the region and beyond. Until both sides find a way to move beyond brinkmanship, the prospect of a genuine settlement is likely to remain distant, and the Middle East will continue to live with the consequences of a conflict that neither war nor theatre has managed to resolve.